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O P I N I O N  
   
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 
 Appellant Julio Aviles, Sr. was charged with various 
federal drug trafficking crimes and related offenses based, in 
large part, on evidence obtained pursuant to a search warrant.  
Aviles moved to suppress evidence obtained in the search or, 
alternatively, for a hearing to challenge the validity of the 
warrant.  The District Court denied his motion, and he was 
3 
 
convicted on all counts.  At sentencing, the Government sought 
a term of mandatory life imprisonment pursuant to the 
Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 841(b), arguing that 
Aviles’s prior state court convictions qualified as “felony drug 
offenses” under the statute.  The District Court agreed and 
sentenced him accordingly.  Aviles appeals the denial of his 
motion to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to the warrant 
and the District Court’s order sentencing him to life 
imprisonment.  We will affirm the District Court’s denial of his 
motion to suppress, but, because we hold that at least two of 
his prior convictions do not qualify as felony drug offenses, we 




 In the course of investigating reports that Aviles was 
conducting a drug trafficking operation, the Lebanon County 
Drug Task Force applied for a search warrant to search, among 
other locations, Aviles’s residence.  In the affidavit of probable 
cause in the warrant application, Detective Ryan Mong and 
Sergeant Brett Hopkins, the affiants, relied upon information 
gathered through multiple controlled buys conducted by a 
confidential information, “RCI-1.”  The affidavit states that 
RCI-1 was involved in a total of eight successful controlled 
buys and describes the five that involved purchases of narcotics 
from Aviles.  These descriptions included, among other things, 
the dates of the buys and, for four of the five, that RCI-1 
exchanged money for narcotics.1  The affidavit also describes 
                                              
1 The application is silent on what she exchanged during the 
fifth buy.   
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the affiants and their experience on the Lebanon County Drug 
Task Force, and offers a general explanation of the execution 
of controlled buys, which included a statement that an 
informant “is provided recorded Drug Task Force currency to 
make the purchase” during a controlled buy.   
 
 A magistrate judge issued a warrant, and, in the 
resulting searches, law enforcement recovered large quantities 
of multiple controlled substances, drug paraphernalia, and 
firearms.  Aviles and twelve co-defendants were arrested and 
charged with various drug trafficking crimes and related 
offenses.  In the twenty-one-count indictment, Aviles was 
charged with conspiracy to distribute heroin, cocaine, and 
cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 
(b)(1)(A)(i), and (b)(1)(A)(iii) (Count 1); possession with 
intent to distribute heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) 
and (b)(1)(B)(i) (Count 2); possession with intent to distribute 
cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 
(b)(1)(B)(iii) (Count 3); possession with intent to distribute 
cocaine hydrochloride in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) 
and (b)(1)(C) (Count 4); distribution of cocaine hydrochloride 
in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C) (Count 5); 
distribution of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 
841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C) (Count 6); distribution of heroin in 
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C) (Counts 11, 
14, and 15); possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug 
trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) 
(Count 19); unlawful possession of a firearm in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (Count 20); and maintaining a drug-
involved premises in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 856(a) (Count 




 After pleading not-guilty, Aviles moved to suppress the 
evidence discovered through the searches authorized by the 
warrant because, he claimed, the officers who had submitted 
the affidavit included false information and omitted other 
information, each of which may have affected the magistrate 
judge’s decision to issue the warrant.  Specifically, he argued 
that, while the general description of controlled buys 
represented that currency is exchanged for drugs at all 
controlled buys, some of Aviles’s buys may have involved 
RCI-1’s exchanging prescription drugs instead of currency.  He 
also claimed that RCI-1 had conducted additional drug-related 
transactions with Aviles outside of the controlled buys.  In his 
motion, Aviles argued that he had made “a substantial 
preliminary showing” that the false information and omissions 
were made intentionally or recklessly, and the falsity and 
omissions undermined the probable cause finding, and, 
therefore, he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing pursuant to 
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155–56 (1978).   
 
 Although the District Court determined that Aviles had 
not made “a substantial preliminary showing” to warrant a 
Franks hearing, the Court conducted an evidentiary hearing to 
allow him to further develop his claim and make that showing.  
The Court allowed both parties to question Detective Mong 
and Sergeant Hopkins regarding their affidavit of probable 
cause but refused the defense’s request to question RCI-1 
based on concerns regarding her identity.  In supplemental 
briefing following the hearing, and based on the officers’ 
testimony, Aviles asserted that at least two of the controlled 
buys involved an exchange of personal property for the drugs,2 
                                              
2 The District Court did not allow the defense to inquire into 
the exact nature of the personal property exchanged because, 
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that Aviles and RCI-1 had a “relationship” independent of the 
controlled buys, that RCI-1 was a heroin addict, and that she 
had failed to abide by some of the officers’ instructions during 
the controlled buys.  He asked that the District Court suppress 
the evidence discovered through the search pursuant to the 
warrant.   
 
 The District Court denied Aviles’s motion to suppress, 
holding that he had failed to make the requisite threshold 
showing under Franks that the inaccuracies and omissions in 
the affidavit were made deliberately or recklessly.  The Court 
also dismissed Aviles’s challenges to RCI-1’s credibility, 
reasoning that the affidavit “contained sufficient information 
for the judge to evaluate the informant’s reliability.”  A. 166 
n.2. 
 
 A jury convicted Aviles of all counts.  Prior to 
sentencing, the Government indicated that it would seek 
mandatory life imprisonment pursuant to the Controlled 
Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 841(b).  Under the law at the time, 
such a sentence could be imposed upon a defendant who had 
two or more previous convictions for “felony drug offenses.”  
21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A).  The Government averred that 
Aviles had three qualifying predicate state convictions: (1) 
possession of a controlled dangerous substance with intent to 
distribute near a school zone in violation of N.J. Stat. § 2C:35-
7, (2) operation of a controlled substance production facility in 
violation of N.J. Stat. § 2C:35-4, and (3) possession of a 
dangerous substance with intent to distribute or manufacture in 
violation of Md. Crim. Code § 5-602.  In support, the 
                                              
as the Government asserted, doing so may reveal RCI-1’s 
identity.   
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Government submitted charging documents and commitment 
orders from the New Jersey convictions and a docket report 
from the Maryland conviction.   
 
 Aviles objected to the application of Section 841(b), 
arguing that none of his prior convictions qualified as felony 
drug offenses.  In order to qualify as a predicate offense, he 
claimed that the state crime must criminalize the same 
controlled substances as those named in the Controlled 
Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 802(44), and the state crimes of 
which he had been convicted each named at least one 
additional substance not listed in § 802(44).  He also argued 
that the Maryland conviction was not his.   
 
 The District Court overruled Aviles’s objections.  The 
Court first noted that whether Aviles’s prior convictions 
qualified as felony drug offenses hinged on the approach used 
to compare them to the federal definition.  Under one approach, 
the categorical approach—described in Taylor v. United 
States—a court may only look to the statutory elements of a 
defendant’s prior offenses and not to the facts underlying those 
convictions.  See 495 U.S. 575, 600–01 (1990).  Under the 
other, the modified categorical approach, a court is permitted 
to look at the statutory elements and record documents from 
the underlying convictions.  Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 
2243, 2249 (2016).  The former approach applies to indivisible 
statutes, or statutes that set forth only one crime, while the 
latter applies to divisible statutes, or statutes that include more 
than one crime.  See id. at 2248–49.  Citing Mathis, the District 
Court first determined that the New Jersey statutes under which 
Aviles had been convicted were divisible and, therefore, 
subject to the modified categorical approach.  Because the 
indictment clearly established that Aviles’s conviction had 
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included heroin as an element for each of his New Jersey 
convictions and because crimes involving heroin are felony 
drug offenses, the Court held that his convictions qualified as 
such for purposes of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1).   
 
 The District Court also briefly addressed Aviles’s 
Maryland conviction, overruling his objection because “a 
history report generated by the Defendant’s fingerprints is 
sufficient to prove that the prior conviction is properly 
attributed to the Defendant.”  A. 618–19.  However, the Court 
noted that a conclusive ruling on the nature of this conviction 
was not necessary in order to impose a mandatory life sentence, 
since it concluded that he had been convicted of the requisite 
two felony drug offenses.  The Court held that its determination 
that Aviles’s New Jersey convictions qualify as such is 
sufficient and, accordingly, sentenced him to a term of life 
imprisonment.  This appeal followed. 
 
 After the District Court entered its sentencing order but 
while Aviles’s appeal was pending, Congress amended the 
Controlled Substances Act with the First Step Act of 2018, 
Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 401.  The First Step Act replaced the 
mandatory term of life imprisonment with a mandatory term of 
25 years.  § 401(a)(2)(A)(ii) (amending 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)).  It 
also replaced the term “felony drug conviction” with “serious 
drug felony” and limited the offenses that qualified for that 
mandatory sentence.  § 401(a)(1) (amending 21 U.S.C. § 802).  
The First Step Act provides that the amendments made by it 
“shall apply to any offense that was committed before the date 
of enactment of this Act, if a sentence for the offense has not 






 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 




 On appeal, Aviles urges that we should vacate his 
conviction because the District Court erred by denying his 
motion to suppress or, alternatively, by denying him a Franks 
hearing.  He also seeks resentencing, arguing that a term of life 
imprisonment should not have been imposed under either the 




 In challenging his conviction, Aviles claims that the 
affidavit submitted in support of the warrant application 
contained two factual errors and omitted several important 
pieces of information.  Specifically, he urges that the affidavit 
incorrectly stated that RCI-1 paid for the drugs with police 
currency at every buy and that RCI-1 exchanged cash for drugs 
on April 15.  He also argues that the affidavit omitted that 
personal property was traded for drugs on March 30, that RCI-
1 scheduled controlled buys without police instruction, that 
RCI-1 was a heroin addict, any information with which a judge 
could assess RCI-1’s reliability, that RCI-1 had an 
“independent relationship” with Aviles, and that the personal 
property was illicit.  Br. for Appellant at 17 (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  Aviles urges that these errors and omissions 
were, at the very least, made recklessly and affected the 
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magistrate judge’s probable cause determination.  Thus, he 
claims that we cannot say with certainty that the warrant would 
have issued had these errors and omissions been corrected, and 
the District Court should have granted his motion to suppress, 
or, alternatively, granted him an opportunity to support his 
motion in a Franks hearing.  On this basis, he asks that we 
vacate his conviction. 
 
 The Fourth Amendment provides that “no Warrants 
shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation.”  U.S. Const. amend. IV.  In Franks, the Supreme 
Court held that a defendant has a right to challenge the veracity 
of statements made in an affidavit of probable cause that 
supported the issuance of a warrant.  See Franks, 438 U.S. at 
167–71.  In order to obtain a hearing to do so, the defendant 
must first make “a substantial preliminary showing” that the 
affidavit contained a false statement or omission that (1) was 
made knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard 
for the truth, and (2) was material to the finding of probable 
cause.  Franks, 438 U.S. at 155–56; see also United States v. 
Yusuf, 461 F.3d 374, 383 (3d Cir. 2006).  A motion to suppress 
is granted if, at the hearing, the defendant establishes the same 
elements by a preponderance of the evidence.  See Franks, 438 
U.S. at 156.  Thus, if Aviles cannot show that he is entitled to 
a Franks hearing, he necessarily cannot show that his motion 
to suppress should have been granted.  Accordingly, we will 
first consider his argument that the District Court erred in 
denying him a Franks hearing.3 
                                              
3 We have not yet determined the standard of review that 
applies to a district court’s denial of a Franks hearing, see 
United States v. Pavulak, 700 F.3d 651, 665 (3d Cir. 2012), but 
because our conclusion is the same under any standard, 
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 In this case, regardless of whether the alleged omissions 
and misstatements were made knowingly or recklessly, Aviles 
has failed to substantially show that probable cause would have 
been lacking if they had not been made.  The following facts, 
among others, were supported by the affidavit and would have 
been unaffected by the deletion of the misstatements and the 
inclusion of the omissions: 
 
• the affiants have extensive experience with the Lebanon 
County Drug Task Force; 
 
• RCI-1 assisted the affiants in a total of eight police-
supervised controlled buys, six of which involved the 
exchange of cash for drugs and two of which involved 
personal property;4  
 
• the affiants conducted “a complete strip search” of RCI-
1 immediately before each buy, A. 60;  
• the affiants witnessed RCI-1 enter the locations of the 
controlled buys without heroin and saw her reappear 
with it afterwards;  
                                              
including plenary review, this case does not require us to adopt 
one. 
4 Aviles contends that drugs were exchanged for drugs, but he 
does not provide sufficient evidence to support his claim.  
Instead, the record shows that the affiants conducted a 
thorough search of RCI-1 and her belongings before every 
controlled buy, and that the personal property exchanged at the 
controlled buys was legal and photographically documented. 
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• the affiants witnessed one of the deals, which occurred 
inside Aviles’s car;  
 
• the affiants conducted a search of RCI-1’s person and 
belongings after each buy; 
 
• the affiants witnessed “short term vehicle traffic . . . 
consistent with drug trafficking” coming and going at 
Aviles’s residence, A. 59; and  
 
• the affiants conducted a background check on Aviles, 
which revealed multiple prior felony drug convictions. 
 
These facts, on their own, provided probable cause to support 
the issuance of the warrant.  Moreover, they are dependent 
upon police observation and, thus, would not be affected by a 
judge’s questioning of RCI-1’s credibility.  Because Aviles has 
not made a substantial showing that the alleged omissions and 
misstatements would have been material to the magistrate 
judge’s probable cause determination, we conclude that the 
District Court did not err in denying his request for a Franks 
hearing.  Accordingly, because he failed to meet his burden to 
support a Franks hearing, he necessarily cannot show that his 
motion to suppress should have been granted.  We will affirm 
the District Court’s denial of that motion. 
 
B. 
 Aviles’s challenge to the District Court’s sentencing 
order is twofold:  First, he urges that the First Step Act, which 
was enacted while this case was pending on appeal, applies.  
Because that legislation replaced the mandatory life sentence 
with a mandatory term of 25 years’ imprisonment and limited 
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the predicate offenses that would qualify a defendant for a 
mandatory sentence, Aviles argues that his life sentence should 
be vacated.  Even if we determine that the First Step Act does 
not apply, he argues that his prior state convictions do not 
qualify as felony drug offenses under the former version of the 
Controlled Substances Act. 
1. 
 Aviles’s first argument, that the First Step Act applies 
to him, is based on the language provided in Section 401(c) of 
that Act:  Amendments made by it “shall apply to any offense 
that was committed before the date of enactment of this Act, if 
a sentence for the offense has not been imposed as of such date 
of enactment.”  Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 401(c).  The crux of 
Aviles’s argument is that a sentence is not “imposed” until 
entry of final judgment by the highest court authorized to 
review it.   
 
 Although we have not yet had occasion to determine the 
applicability of the First Step Act to cases pending on appeal 
at the time of its enactment, the Seventh Circuit recently 
addressed the issue in United States v. Pierson and held that 
the defendant’s “[s]entence was ‘imposed’ here within the 
meaning of [the First Step Act] when the district court 
sentenced the defendant.”  925 F.3d 913, 927–28 (7th Cir. 
2019).  The court rejected reasoning from United States v. 
Clark, which suggested that “[a] case is not yet final when it is 
pending on appeal,” id. at 928 (quoting 110 F.3d 15, 17 (6th 
Cir. 1997)), because “no other circuits have applied Clark’s 
definition of ‘imposed’” and because the word more 
commonly applies to the activity of district courts.  Id.; see also 
id. at 927 (citing federal statutes and rules that indicate that a 
sentence is imposed by a district court). 
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 We agree.  “Imposing” sentences is the business of 
district courts, while courts of appeals are tasked with 
reviewing them by either affirming or vacating them.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 568 (3d Cir. 2009) (“In 
other words, if the district court’s sentence is procedurally 
sound, we will affirm it unless no reasonable sentencing court 
would have imposed the same sentence on that particular 
defendant for the reasons the district court provided.” 
(emphasis added)); Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 352 
(2007) (“A pro-Guidelines ‘presumption of reasonableness’ 
will increase the likelihood that courts of appeals will affirm 
such sentences, thereby increasing the likelihood that 
sentencing judges will impose such sentences.” (emphasis 
added)).  Congress did not refer to “finality,” and imposition 
and finality are two different concepts.  Congress’s use of the 
word “imposed” thus clearly excludes cases in which a 
sentencing order has been entered by a district court from the 
reach of the amendments made by the First Step Act.5  
Accordingly, we hold that that Act does not apply to Aviles. 
                                              
5 Many of the cases to which Aviles cites in support of his 
argument discuss abatement by repeal, a common law rule 
requiring “abate[ment] of all prosecutions which had not 
reached a final disposition in the highest court authorized to 
review them” when a criminal statute is repealed or reenacted 
with different penalties.  Bradley v. United States, 410 U.S. 
605, 607–08 (1973).  But even that rule does not apply where 
“there is statutory direction or legislative history to the 
contrary.”  United States v. Dixon, 648 F.3d 195, 199 (3d Cir. 
2011) (quoting United States v. Jacobs, 919 F.2d 10, 11 (3d 
Cir. 1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 
Bradley, 410 U.S. at 608 (“To avoid such results, legislatures 




 We next turn to Aviles’s argument that the District 
Court erred in imposing a life sentence under the prior version 
of the Controlled Substances Act.  Specifically, Aviles urges 
that his New Jersey and Maryland convictions do not qualify 
as felony drug offenses under that Act.  Because his challenge 
presents a purely legal question, we exercise plenary review 
over the District Court’s sentencing order.  United States v. 
Henderson, 841 F.3d 623, 626 (3d Cir. 2016). 
 
 Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), convicted 
defendants were subject to a mandatory term of life 
imprisonment if they had previously been convicted of two or 
more “felony drug offenses.”  “Felony drug offense” is defined 
as: 
an offense that is punishable by 
imprisonment for more than one 
year under any law of the United 
                                              
prosecutions by including in the repealing statute a specific 
clause stating that prosecutions of offenses under the repealed 
statute were not to be abated.”).  Congress provided statutory 
direction here with its use of the word “imposed.” 
   Aviles also argues that our reading of Section 401(c) 
should be “precluded by the doctrine of constitutional 
avoidance.”  Br. for Appellant at 43.  However, similar statutes 
have been held to not apply retroactively and have not raised 
constitutional concerns.  See, e.g., Bradley, 410 U.S. at 609–11 
(holding that an amendment to a criminal statute did not apply 
retroactively to offenses committed prior to the effective date 
of the amendment, even though the defendants were sentenced 
after that date). 
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States or of a State or foreign 
country that prohibits or restricts 
conduct relating to narcotic drugs, 
marihuana, anabolic steroids, or 
depressant or stimulant 
substances. 
21 U.S.C. § 802(44).   Other subsections provide the controlled 
dangerous substances that fall under each substance group.  
See, e.g., § 802(17) (defining “narcotic drug”). 
 
 To determine whether a conviction qualifies as a felony 
drug offense, we typically employ the “categorical approach,” 
which requires us to “compar[e] the elements of the statute 
forming the basis of the defendant’s conviction with the 
elements of the generic crime,” i.e., the elements of a felony 
drug offense.  Henderson, 841 F.3d at 627 (quoting Descamps 
v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 257 (2013)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  A conviction will qualify as a predicate under 
this approach “only if the statute’s elements are the same as, or 
narrower than, those of the generic offense.”  Id. (quoting 
Descamps, 570 U.S. at 257) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(emphasis in original).  We do not consider the facts underlying 
a conviction when applying this approach.  Id.  Here, that 
would require us to compare the elements of the crimes defined 
in the New Jersey and Maryland statutes to the definition of 
“felony drug offense.”  If one of the state statutes is broader, or 
covers more conduct than the federal law, then Aviles’s 
conviction under that law cannot qualify as a felony drug 
offense. 
 
 The categorical approach cannot be applied with ease, 
however, where a statute of conviction is “divisible,” or 
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contains alternative elements, thereby making it impossible to 
determine precisely which crime was committed.  Id.  When 
presented with such a statute, we employ the “modified 
categorical approach,” which allows courts to “look[] to a 
limited class of documents (for example, the indictment, jury 
instructions, or plea agreement and colloquy) to determine 
what crime, with what elements, a defendant was convicted 
of.”  Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2249 (2016) 
(citation omitted).  In this case, we would then compare the 
elements of that crime to the definition of “felony drug 
offense” to determine whether Aviles’s state conviction 
qualifies as such. 
 
 Although these two approaches appear straightforward, 
difficulty ensues when presented with a statute that contains 
alternatives that may not be elements and, instead, may be 
“various factual means of committing a single element” that “a 
jury need not find (or a defendant admit).”  Id.  If the listed 
alternatives are indeed elements, the modified categorical 
approach applies.  If, on the other hand, the listed alternatives 
are means of committing the crime, so that we are presented 
with essentially one crime, the categorical approach applies.  
Thus, “[t]he first task for a sentencing court faced with an 
alternatively phrased statute is . . . to determine whether its 
listed items are elements or means.”  Id. at 2256.  In Mathis, 
the Supreme Court enumerated a three-step process for doing 
so:  First, a sentencing court should look to see if a state court 
decision “definitively answers the question.”  Id.  Second, the 
court looks to “the statute on its face.”  Id.  “If statutory 
alternatives carry different punishments, then . . . they must be 
elements.”  Id.  On the other hand, if the list provides only 
“illustrative examples” of how the same crime might be 
committed, then they are merely means.  Id. (citation and 
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internal quotation marks omitted).  If these “authoritative 
sources of state law” “fail[] to provide clear answers,” then a 
sentencing court may look to “the record of prior conviction 
itself.”  Id.  The Court explained that if an indictment and jury 
instructions reiterated the alternatives laid out in the law or 
used an umbrella term when charging the defendant, the 
alternatives are means.  Id. at 2257.  Conversely, reference to 
one of the alternatives at the exclusion of the others indicates 
that the listed alternatives are elements.  Id.  The Court warned 
that: 
such record materials will not in 
every case speak plainly, and if 
they do not, a sentencing judge 
will not be able to satisfy “Taylor’s 
demand for certainty” when 
determining whether a defendant 
was convicted of a generic offense.  
But between those documents and 
state law, that kind of 
indeterminacy should prove more 
the exception than the rule. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
 The District Court imposed a mandatory life sentence 
based on Aviles’s two prior convictions under New Jersey state 
law.  Because all three state statutes of conviction—both New 
Jersey statutes and the Maryland statute—explicitly list, or 
incorporate other provision’s lists of, covered controlled 
substances, and each criminalize conduct involving at least one 
substance not covered by Section 841’s definition of “felony 
drug offense,” we need to delve more deeply under Mathis to 
determine whether the statute is divisible.  If it is divisible 
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because the alternative drug types listed or incorporated by the 
state statutes are elements, such that different crimes are 
enumerated, we may use the modified categorical approach 
and look at the relevant criminal records to determine whether 
those state offenses are predicate offenses.  On the other hand, 
if those substances are merely means, such that there is only 
one crime with different ways of committing it, then the state 
statute criminalizes conduct broader than that included in the 
definition of “felony drug offense,” and Aviles’s convictions 
cannot qualify as such.  We must consider whether substance 
type is an element or a means in each statute of conviction 
individually. 
 
 We first address Aviles’s conviction under N.J. Stat. 
Ann § 2C:35-4 for maintaining or operating a controlled 
dangerous substance production facility.  That New Jersey law 
provides: 
Except as authorized by P.L.1970, 
c. 226 (C.24:21-1 et seq.), any 
person who knowingly maintains 
or operates any premises, place or 
facility used for the manufacture of 
methamphetamine, lysergic acid 
diethylamide, phencyclidine, 
gamma hydroxybutyrate, 
flunitrazepam, marijuana in an 
amount greater than five pounds 
or ten plants or any substance 
listed in Schedule I or II, or the 
analog of any such substance, or 
any person who knowingly aids, 
promotes, finances or otherwise 
participates in the maintenance or 
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operations of such premises, place 
or facility, is guilty of a crime of 
the first degree and shall, except as 
provided in N.J.S.2C:35-12, be 
sentenced to a term of 
imprisonment which shall include 
the imposition of a minimum term 
which shall be fixed at, or between, 
one-third and one-half of the 
sentence imposed, during which 
the defendant shall be ineligible 
for parole. Notwithstanding the 
provisions of subsection a. of 
N.J.S.2C:43-3, the court may also 
impose a fine not to exceed 
$750,000.00 or five times the 
street value of all controlled 
dangerous substances, controlled 
substance analogs, gamma 
hydroxybutyrate or flunitrazepam 
at any time manufactured or stored 
at such premises, place or facility, 
whichever is greater. 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:35-4 (emphasis added). 
 First, we look to see if a New Jersey state court decision 
“definitively answers the question.”  Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 
2256.  Aviles asserts that State v. Kittrell, 678 A.2d 209, 216 
(N.J. 1996), does so by referencing the drugs listed in the 
statute as “CDS,” or controlled dangerous substances.  But that 
case does not address the exact issue before us: whether the 
substances listed in or referenced by the statute are means or 
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elements.  See Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2256 (using an Iowa state 
court decision explicitly holding that the Iowa statute’s listed 
alternatives are means).  We have neither found nor been 
alerted to any New Jersey state court decision speaking to this 
discrete issue and, thus, must turn to the other two methods 
provided by the Supreme Court in Mathis. 
 
 The next method requires us to consider the language of 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:35-4.  As explained above, if different 
punishments are proscribed, then the alternatives are elements.  
Id.; see also Henderson, 841 F.3d at 630 (holding that an 
alternative list of substances provides separate elements in part 
because the statute provides different maximum sentences for 
violators).  We have also recently noted that the inverse is true:  
The statutory provision of the same punishment, regardless of 
which alternative was involved in a crime, could indicate that 
the alternatives are means.  See Hillocks v. Att’y Gen. United 
States, No. 17-2384, 2019 WL 3772101, at *7–8 (3d Cir. 
2019); see also Harbin v. Sessions, 860 F.3d 58, 65 (2d Cir. 
2017) (reasoning that the fact that a statute carries the same 
punishment regardless of which controlled substance is used 
shows “that each controlled substance is a mere ‘means’ of 
violating the statute, not a separate alternative element”).  The 
New Jersey statute provides that any person found guilty under 
it “is guilty of a crime of the first degree,” regardless of the 
substance or substances used in the commission of a crime.  See 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:35-4.  And N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:43-6(a)(1) 
provides that any person convicted of a crime in the first degree 
“may be sentenced to imprisonment . . . for a specific term of 
years which shall be fixed by the court and shall be between 10 
and 20 years . . . .”  Because the punishment does not vary 
based on substance type, the statute, on its face, could be said 
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to indicate that its alternative list of substances are merely 
means.  See Hillocks, 2019 WL 3772101, at *8. 
 
 Additionally, the language of N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:35-4 
does not indicate that a jury must agree on the particular 
substance manufactured.  Much like the hypothetical statute 
described in Mathis, which allowed jurors to disagree over the 
exact weapon used as long as all agree that the defendant used 
a “deadly weapon,” 136 S. Ct. at 2249, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:35-
4 appears to allow some jurors to conclude that one drug was 
being manufactured in a particular instance, while others may 
believe that the drug involved was a different one.  As long as 
they could agree that a defendant maintained or operated a 
facility for the production of a controlled substance, the jury 
may determine that the defendant is guilty.  See Harbin, 860 
F.3d at 65 (concluding that a similarly worded New York 
statute “does not suggest that a jury must agree on the 
particular substance sold”). 
 
 The Government supports its argument for the opposite 
conclusion by citing to the discretionary fine provided by N.J. 
Stat. Ann. § 2C:35-4, whereby the fine may “not to exceed 
$750,000.00 or five times the street value of all controlled 
dangerous substances, controlled substance analogs, gamma 
hydroxybutyrate or flunitrazepam at any time manufactured or 
stored at such premises, place or facility, whichever is greater.”  
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:35-4 (emphasis added).  Because the 
amount of that fine depends upon the specific drug type 
involved, the Government urges that the punishment, in fact, 
varies based on the substance or substances used, and, thus, 
drug type must be an element.  Id.  We disagree.  We first note 
that the fine is discretionary and may not be imposed in all 
cases.  Even if the fine was mandatory, however, its provision 
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in the statute does not support the Government’s argument 
because, in imposing the fine, the sentencing court must total 
the value of all substances involved in a single conviction.  
Thus, the statute itself contemplates a single criminal 
conviction for a violation that could involve more than one 
substance.  If the Government’s interpretation were correct and 
drug type was an element, a defendant would be charged with 
separate offenses based on each drug, even if they were being 
manufactured at the same place and at the same time.  Because 
the discretionary fine contemplates the opposite scenario, it 
supports our conclusion that the substances listed in the statute 
are merely means by which the crime may be committed.6 
 
 Having concluded that Aviles’s conviction under N.J. 
Stat. Ann. § 2C:35-4 is not a predicate felony drug offense, 
both of his two remaining convictions must qualify as such in 
order for us to affirm the District Court’s sentencing order.  
Thus, we turn to Aviles’s conviction under Md. Crim. Code § 
5-602.7  As noted above, the Maryland statute covers a broader 
                                              
6 The Government argues that the New Jersey Pleading and 
Practice Form and the New Jersey Model Criminal Jury Charge 
for N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:35-4 may be considered in our 
analysis.  But Mathis instructs us only to look at state court 
decisions and the language of the statute itself as “authoritative 
sources of state law,” 136 S. Ct. at 2256, and this Court has 
recently “rejected the significance the Government places on 
the structure of the model jury instructions.”  Hillocks, 2019 
WL 3772101, at *8; see also Harbin, 860 F.3d at 67–68 
(rejecting the Government’s reliance on pattern jury 
instructions). 
7 Aviles’s second New Jersey conviction, under N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§ 2C:35-7, presents a thorny issue unaddressed by Mathis.  The 
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set of substances than the federal definition of “felony drug 
offense.”  Thus, if the list of substances incorporated by Md. 
Crim. Code § 5-602 are means, the categorical approach would 
apply, and Aviles’s conviction could not qualify as a felony 
drug offense.  On the other hand, if the incorporated substances 
are elements, the modified categorical approach would apply, 
and we look to the record documents underlying that 
conviction to determine of exactly which crime, with which 
elements, Aviles was convicted.  Even if the modified 
categorical approach applies, however, the record documents 
from that conviction provide no indication of the substance 
involved in Aviles’s conviction.  Instead, those documents 
merely state that Aviles was charged with and found guilty of 
“Poss. of CDS W/I to Dist/Manufacture” and “Poss. of CDS.”  
A. 541.  Because we would not be able to determine the exact 
crime of which Aviles was convicted, we could not rule that 
                                              
statute provides for two different punishments, depending on 
whether “the violation involves less than one ounce of 
marijuana.”  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:35-7.  Thus, it is divisible, 
but only into two alternative elements, namely, violations 
involving less than one ounce of marijuana, and “all other 
cases,” which would include any other “controlled dangerous 
substance” or “controlled substance analog” (the “other 
controlled substances”).  Id.  Looking at the definition of the 
other controlled substances, the drug type appears to be a mere 
means of committing the latter crime.  Thus, while the statute 
is technically divisible, the drug type, other than the marijuana 
exception, does not appear to be an element.  Because this type 
of “hybrid” statute is not addressed by Mathis and because we 
conclude that Aviles’s Maryland conviction clearly cannot 
qualify as a federal drug offense, we decline to address whether 
his second New Jersey conviction does. 
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that conviction is a predicate felony drug offense using that 
approach. 
 
 We conclude that two of Aviles’s three prior state 
convictions, his convictions under N.J. Stat. Ann. 2C:35-4 and 
Md. Crim. Code § 5-602, cannot qualify as felony drug 
offenses.  Thus, he could not have been subject to a mandatory 
term of life imprisonment.  See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) 
(providing for a mandatory life sentence where a defendant has 
been convicted of at least two felony drug offenses).  
Accordingly, we will vacate the District Court’s sentencing 
order.8 
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court’s denial of Aviles’s motion to suppress, and we will 
vacate the judgment of sentence and remand for the District 
Court to determine the appropriate sentence. 
                                              
8 We do not address the issue, not raised or briefed before us, 
that could arise on remand, namely, whether the First Step Act 
will apply on resentencing.  See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 
2019 WL 2524786, at *1 (N.D. Ohio June 18, 2019) appeal 
pending, No. 19-3711 (6th Cir. July 19, 2019) (holding that the 
amendments made through the First Step Act applies to a 
defendant on resentencing, even though he was originally 
sentenced before the enactment of the Act); United States v. 
Uriarte, 2019 WL 1858516, at *4 (N.D. Ill. April 25, 2019) 
(holding the same). 
